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I. INTRODUCTION 
Lawsuits filed by the cities of San Francisco and Oakland in 
California state court allege that five of the world’s largest oil 
companies actively campaigned to promote fossil fuel use even as 
they knew that their products would contribute to dangerous 
global warming and associated sea level rise. The suits, which 
initially rested on state public nuisance law alone, seek abatement 
orders requiring the defendants to fund adaptation measures 
ranging from the construction of sea walls to the elevation of low-
lying property and buildings. Other coastal jurisdictions in 
California—and, separately, the State of Rhode Island, City of New 
York, City of Baltimore, King County (Washington), three local 
governments in Colorado, and an association of Pacific Coast 
fishermen—have filed similar suits asserting public nuisance as 
well as other tort, statutory, and public trust claims for sea level 
rise and other climate impacts, seeking both abatement and 
damages. 
This Article explores the potential for state public nuisance 
claims to facilitate adaptation, resource protection, and other 
climate change responses by coastal communities in California.1 
The California public nuisance actions represent just the latest 
chapter in efforts to spur responses to climate change and attribute 
responsibility for climate change through the common law. Part II 
of this Article describes the California public nuisance lawsuits 
and situates them in the context of common law actions directed 
against climate change. Part III considers the preliminary 
defenses that defendants have raised and could raise in the 
California public nuisance lawsuits, including the existence of 
state common law in this context, separation of powers and the 
political question doctrine, displacement and preemption, and 
standing. Part IV considers the potential merits of the plaintiffs’ 
public nuisance claims under California law. 
A product manufacturer may be held liable for assisting in the 
creation of a public nuisance under California law if the 
manufacturer promoted a harmful product with knowledge of the 
 
1. We do not address in detail other common law claims raised in the 
California cases or any of the claims brought in other jurisdictions. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
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hazards involved.2 Defendants are likely to dispute whether their 
research and marketing efforts constituted promotion of a harmful 
product and whether they knew of the link between their products 
and the hazards of climate change. Outside of California, the law 
of public nuisance also may allow defendants to assert that they 
lacked control of the instrumentality of harm—i.e., fossil fuels—
once they were sold to consumers. Ultimately, even if plaintiffs are 
successful in establishing the elements of public nuisance, courts 
will have to grapple with fashioning a suitable remedy. Although 
the primary relief sought, establishment of an abatement fund, 
seems relatively straightforward, courts nevertheless may hesitate 
to tackle a global problem that hardly resembles run-of-the-mill 
public nuisances.3 
Notwithstanding the obstacles that plaintiffs face in litigating 
and proving public nuisance, fossil fuel companies face the 
prospect of protracted litigation and a risk of substantial liability. 
Beyond the immediate outcomes of specific cases, these suits could 
spur direct federal action on the issue, encourage an industry shift 
away from fossil fuels, and shape the narrative on the reality of—
and responsibility for—climate change. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The California Lawsuits 
The San Francisco and Oakland climate change lawsuits 
(collectively referred to as the “San Francisco Bay lawsuits”) are 
largely identical. Both suits name as defendants the “five largest 
investor-owned fossil fuel corporations in the world as measured 
by their historic production of fossil fuels.”4 The complaints allege 
 
2. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 324–
25, 328 (Ct. App. 2006). 
3. See, e.g., California v. BP, No. C 16-06011 WHA, No. C 17-06012 WHA, 
2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (suggesting that “the scope of 
the worldwide predicament [of climate change] demands the most comprehensive 
view available” and that “[a] patchwork of fifty different answers to the same 
fundamental global issue would be unworkable.”). 
4. First Amended Complaint at 2, City of San Francisco v. BP, No. 3:17-cv-
06012-WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter SF Am. Compl.] (naming BP, 
Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants); 
First Amended Complaint at 2, City of Oakland v. BP, No. 3:17-cv-06011-WHA 
3
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that these defendants “did not simply produce fossil fuels” but also 
engaged in sophisticated public relations “campaigns to promote 
pervasive fossil fuel usage” and downplayed risks even as they 
knew that their fossil fuels were contributing to global warming.5 
As amended, the suits seek an abatement fund remedy pursuant 
to California and federal public nuisance law and identify various 
abatement projects that are already being planned or undertaken 
in response to sea level rise.6 Notably, the plaintiff cities “do not 
seek to impose liability” for damages, nor do they seek to restrain 
the defendants’ business operations.7 As the complaints state, 
“[these] case[s are], fundamentally, about shifting the costs of 
abating sea level rise harm . . . back onto the companies.”8 
Of the recent climate change public nuisance litigation, the 
San Francisco Bay lawsuits have progressed relatively rapidly. 
Defendants removed the cases to federal district court, which 
denied the plaintiffs’ motions to remand the cases to state court 
and held that the plaintiffs’ nuisance claims “are necessarily 
governed by federal common law” (hereinafter “San Francisco Bay 
removal order”).9 The district court subsequently dismissed the 
suits, holding that the Clean Air Act displaced the claims to the 
extent that they were based on domestic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions and that any foreign GHG emissions linked to the 
defendants must be addressed by Congress or the executive branch 
rather than the courts (hereinafter “San Francisco Bay dismissal 
 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Oakland Am. Compl.] (naming BP, Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants). 
5. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 3; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 
2–3. 
6. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 1, 5, 58–61; Oakland Am. Compl., supra 
note 4, at 5, 49–55. 
7. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 5; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 
5. 
8. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 5; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 
5. 
9. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
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order”).10 The plaintiffs have appealed the district court’s rulings 
to the Ninth Circuit.11 
The other California climate change lawsuits, filed 
individually by Marin County,12 San Mateo County,13 the City of 
Imperial Beach,14 Santa Cruz County,15 the City of Santa Cruz,16 
and the City of Richmond,17 and the Pacific Coast Federation of 
Fishermen’s Associations,18 are substantially broader than the 
San Francisco Bay lawsuits in several ways. First, these other 
suits allege a range of tort claims in addition to public nuisance, 
including: negligence, strict liability, trespass, failure to warn, and 
design defect.19 Second, these suits name as defendants not only 
the five oil companies named in the San Francisco Bay lawsuits, 
but also various other companies engaged in the production and 
sale of coal, oil, and natural gas.20 Third, while these suits 
 
10. City of Oakland v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–26 (N.D. Cal. 2018), 
appeal filed, Case No. 18-16663; see also City of New York v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d 
466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed, Case No. 18-2188 (finding New York City could 
not pursue nuisance and trespass claims against oil and gas companies for 
injuries arising from greenhouse gases). 
11. See Notice of Appeal, City of Oakland v. BP, No. 18-16663 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
24, 2018). 
12. Complaint, County of Marin v. Chevron, No. CV 1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Jul. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Marin Compl.]. 
13. Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron, No. 17CIV03222 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017) [hereinafter San Mateo Compl.]. 
14. Complaint, Imperial Beach v. Chevron, No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Jul. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Imperial Beach Compl.]. 
15. Complaint, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, No. 17CV03243 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 20, 2017) [hereinafter City of Santa Cruz Compl.]. 
16. Complaint, County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, No. 17CV03242 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017) [hereinafter County of Santa Cruz Compl.]. 
17. Complaint, City of Richmond v. Chevron, No. C18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Richmond Compl.]. 
18. Complaint, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc. v. 
Chevron Corp., No. C18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) [hereinafter 
Pacific Coast Compl.]. 
19. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 79–98; San Mateo Compl., supra note 
13, at 78–97; Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 75–94; City of Santa Cruz 
Compl., supra note 15, at 95–118; County of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, 
at 99–122; Richmond Compl., supra note 17, at 90–112; Pacific Coast Compl., 
supra note 18, at 76–90. 
20. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 7–22; San Mateo Compl., supra note 13, 
at 6–22; Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 6–22; City of Santa Cruz 
Compl., supra note 15, at 6–20; County of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, at 
7–21; Richmond Compl., supra note 17, at 6–20; Pacific Coast Compl., supra note 
18, at 7–25. All together, these defendants are alleged to be directly responsible 
5
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resemble the San Francisco Bay lawsuits in seeking “to ensure that 
the parties responsible for sea level rise bear the costs of its 
impacts”21 on the plaintiffs, some of them also seek to internalize 
the costs associated with other impacts from climate change, 
including drought and wildfire.22 Finally, these suits request—in 
addition to abatement—disgorgement of profits, compensatory 
damages, and punitive damages.23 
Like the San Francisco Bay lawsuits, the other California local 
government cases were removed to federal court. However, those 
other cases were assigned to a different federal judge, who 
remanded the San Mateo, Marin, and Imperial Beach cases to state 
court after determining that the claims should be governed by state 
common law rather than federal common law (hereinafter the “San 
Mateo remand order”).24 At the time of this writing, the San Mateo 
remand order was on appeal before the Ninth Circuit, and the 
remand order was stayed pending resolution of the appeal; motions 
to remand the Santa Cruz and Richmond cases (hereinafter “Santa 
Cruz cases”), which were filed later, were also granted but stayed 
pending the appeal of the San Mateo remand order,25 and then 
consolidated with the San Mateo appeal.26 
B. Common Law Litigation on Climate Change 
The recent spate of climate cases are only the latest common 
law battles over climate change. Frustrated by the slow pace of 
legislative and regulatory responses, particularly at the federal 
level, and having suffered the adverse impacts of climate-related 
 
for 20% of CO2 emissions worldwide between 1965 and 2015. Marin Compl., supra 
note 12, at 3. 
21. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 4; San Mateo Compl., supra note 13, at 
4; see Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 4. 
22. See, e.g., City of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 15, at 34–40; County of 
Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, 34–35, 39–40. 
23. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 99; San Mateo Compl., supra note 13, at 
98; Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 95; City of Santa Cruz Compl., supra 
note 15, at 119; County of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, at 123; Richmond 
Compl., supra note 17, at 112; Pacific Coast Compl., supra note 18, at 90. 
24. County of San Mateo v. Chevron, 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 
2018), appeal filed Case No. 18-15503. 
25. County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, 3:18-cv-00450-VC, 3:18-cv-00458-VC, 
3:18-cv-00732-VC (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2018). 
26. See Order Consolidating Appeals, County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, No. 
18-16376 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
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slow-onset changes and extreme events, past plaintiffs have filed a 
number of suits invoking common law doctrines.27 These suits 
have named fossil fuel companies, power companies, and 
automobile manufacturers as defendants, and they have sought to 
assign responsibility to these actors for their roles in emitting 
GHGs, promoting uses of their products that emit GHGs, and 
concealing the serious threats posed by climate change.28 
The tort theories expressed in these earlier lawsuits are 
similar to those we are seeing now: trespass, negligence, strict 
liability (for design defect and failure to warn), private nuisance, 
public nuisance, and civil conspiracy.29  From the outset, 
commentators have observed that attempts to apply such theories 
to the complex and “super wicked problem” of climate change are 
likely to encounter difficulties with respect to basic elements of 
traditional tort analysis—especially duty, breach, and causation.30 
 
27. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); Native Vill. 
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010), petition for writ of mandamus 
denied sub nom. In re Comer, 562 U.S. 1133 (2011) (Comer I); Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460 
(Comer II); California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
17, 2007). 
28. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418 (naming as defendants the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and four private companies that operate fossil-fuel 
fired power plants); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853 n.1 (naming as defendants multiple 
oil companies and power companies); Comer, 585 F.3d at 859 (naming as 
defendants companies engaged in energy, fossil fuels, and chemical industries); 
General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (noting that six defendant 
automakers produce vheicles that emit over 20% of anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
emissions in U.S.). 
29. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429 (asserting federal and state 
public nuisance claims); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853 (asserting federal public 
nuisance claim); General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (asserting federal 
and state public nuisance claims); Comer, 585 F.3d at 859–60 (alleging state law 
claims of public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, 
fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy). 
30. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1158–60 
(2009) (discussing characterization of climate change as a “super wicked 
problem”). See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit 
Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 135, 136 (2011) (noting common law 
climate change cases “pose unique difficulties because current atmospheric levels 
of GHGs result from the cumulative emissions of millions or billions of emitters” 
and “no specific injury can be attributed to any specific polluter”); Douglas A. 
Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2011) 
(“[C]ourts in all likelihood will agree with commentators that nuisance and other 
7
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With respect to the element of duty, it is not obvious what the duty 
of ordinary care requires in the context of climate change.31 
Moreover, demonstrating breach of the duty of care generally 
requires a showing that the harms from defendants’ activities 
outweighed the benefits.32 Such a showing can be difficult to make 
in light of the social value and ubiquity of GHG-generating 
activities. Finally, the causation analysis is complicated by the 
multiplicity of GHG sources and the difficulty of attributing 
specific events to specific sources or, in some instances and to 
varying degrees, to climate change more generally.33 
Of the available tort theories, public nuisance has been 
regarded by some as the most promising for climate change 
plaintiffs because it focuses on harms to the general public rather 
than harms to individual landowners or victims.34 Characterizing 
climate change as a public nuisance fits within a long history of 
addressing pollution problems as public nuisances, albeit on a 
different scale.35 Public nuisance doctrine requires proof of an 
unreasonable and substantial interference with a public right.36 As 
such, it arguably offers the advantage of allowing plaintiffs to 
direct courts’ attention to the severity of the harms suffered rather 
than on the balancing of those harms against the social benefit of 
defendants’ conduct.37 
Climate change litigation has invoked not only tort claims, but 
also the public trust doctrine. In a series of public trust cases 
brought in state and federal courts around the country, youth 
plaintiffs suing federal and state governments have contended that 
the defendants have abdicated their trust duty to protect the 
 
traditional tort theories are overwhelmed by the magnitude and the complexity 
of the climate change conundrum.”). 
31. Kysar, supra note 30, at 10–20. 
32. Id. at 28. 
33. Id. at 29–42. 
34. Id. at 24. 
35. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); see 
generally Tracy D. Hester, A New Front Blowing In: State Law and the Future of 
Climate Change Public Nuisance Litigation, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 49, 56 (2012) 
(discussing various uses of public nuisance to address environmental threats). 
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821B(1), 821B(1)(a) (Am. Law Inst. 
1979); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1334 (2000) (defining public nuisance as 
“a substantial and unreasonable interference with a right held in common by the 
general public, in use of public facilities, in health, safety, and convenience”).   
37. Kysar, supra note 30, at 25. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
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atmosphere and other natural resources.38 Alleging a trust duty 
based on the common law or on constitutional provisions, these 
plaintiffs have generally sought to compel more stringent 
government regulation of GHG emissions, as well as more 
protective management of public lands.39 
Thus far, courts have viewed common law tort and public trust 
claims in climate change cases with a mix of annoyance, 
skepticism, curiosity, and inspiration. Some trial courts have held 
that threshold issues preclude consideration of the claims, finding 
that plaintiffs lack standing or that their cases pose nonjusticiable 
political questions.40 Two U.S. Court of Appeals panels, 
meanwhile, have held that there is no threshold bar to such 
claims.41 Where cases have survived threshold challenges they 
have generally foundered on other grounds.42 
 
38. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2012) (alleging 
violation of federal public trust); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 
1263 (D. Or. 2016) (alleging violation of federal public trust and substantive due 
process); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1222–23 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) 
(alleging violation of state public trust duty to protect atmosphere); Kanuk v. 
State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1090–91 (Alaska 2014) (alleging 
breach of state’s public trust obligations under state constitution). 
39. See, e.g., Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (seeking injunction directing “six 
federal agencies to take all necessary actions to enable carbon dioxide emissions 
to peak by December 2012 and decline by at least six percent per year beginning 
in 2013”); Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1234 (challenging “decisions defendants 
have made across a vast set of topics—decisions like whether and to what extent 
to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants and vehicles, whether to permit 
fossil fuel extraction and development to take place on federal lands, how much 
to charge for use of those lands,  . . .”). 
40. See, e.g., Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024–26 (dismissing federal 
common law nuisance claims on displacement and separation of powers grounds); 
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876–83 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (dismissing federal common law nuisance claims on grounds that 
plaintiffs lacked standing and that their tort claims were nonjusticiable to the 
political question doctrine), aff’d on alternative grounds, 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1225–27 (holding state public trust claim 
displaced by state statute); Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1096–1103 (affirming dismissal of 
state public trust claims either for lack of justiciability or on prudential grounds). 
See also Alec L. v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x. 7, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming 
dismissal of climate change suit based on federal public trust doctrine on grounds 
that public trust doctrine is a matter of state law).  
41. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 860; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 
309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009). 
42. See infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing Comer); see also 
infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (discussing Am. Elec. Power Co.). 
9
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The Supreme Court directly addressed the availability of 
federal public nuisance as a means to address greenhouse gas 
emissions in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”).43 
Led by Connecticut and several other states, the plaintiffs in AEP 
asserted public nuisance claims and sought injunctive relief 
against electric power companies collectively responsible for one-
tenth of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.44 The Court held such 
claims to be unavailable under federal law, explaining that “the 
Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any 
federal common-law right to seek abatement” of carbon 
emissions.45 Displacement resulted from Congress’ delegation of 
authority to regulate carbon emissions, regardless of whether EPA 
had actually exercised that authority.46 
Following the AEP decision, a plausible case still could have 
been made for the viability of federal public nuisance actions for 
damages, an issue not raised in the AEP litigation. However, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected this possibility in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp.47 While acknowledging that “the lack of a federal remedy 
may be a factor to be considered in determining whether Congress 
has displaced federal common law,” the Ninth Circuit, applying 
Supreme Court precedents on displacement, held “if a cause of 
action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.”48 
Although AEP and Kivalina yielded unfavorable outcomes for 
plaintiffs seeking to redress climate change through federal public 
nuisance, their holdings were fairly narrow. Claims based on 
doctrines other than federal public nuisance remain potentially 
viable and continue to be litigated.49 Moreover, as described 
further in Part III, neither AEP nor Kivalina foreclosed the 
possibility that a public nuisance claim based on state law might 
be viable. In AEP, the Supreme Court expressly left the matter 
open for consideration in further litigation.50 And in Kivalina, the 
 
43. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 410. 
44. Id. at 418. 
45. Id. at 424. 
46. Id. at 426.   
47. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. 
48. Id.   
49. See, e.g., Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262–63 (denying motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ claim that government’s fossil fuel policies violate federal public trust 
doctrine and the U.S. Constitution). 
50. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429.   
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
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concurrence noted that “[d]isplacement of the federal common law 
does not leave those injured by air pollution without a remedy,” 
and suggested state nuisance law as “an available option to the 
extent it is not preempted by federal law.”51 
The availability of state common law claims was separately 
taken up in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, where plaintiff property 
owners alleged that certain power, fossil fuel, and chemical 
companies’ GHG emissions contributed to climate change and 
exacerbated the harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, constituting 
a private nuisance as well as a public nuisance, trespass, 
negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
civil conspiracy.52 The case involved a convoluted procedural 
history, featuring a dismissal in district court, a reversal at the 
Fifth Circuit, an en banc decision to vacate the reversal due to 
failure to muster a quorum, the plaintiffs’ filing a writ of 
mandamus asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the panel 
decision, the denial of the writ,53 the plaintiffs’ re-filing their case 
in district court, and dismissal based on res judicata grounds—
though not, ultimately, on the merits.54 Notably, the Fifth Circuit 
held in the first go-around that a diversity suit brought under state 
common law for damages was materially distinguishable from 
public nuisance claims brought under federal common law and 
seeking an injunction.55 The panel did not address the merits of 
the public or private nuisance claims, leaving that for a prospective 
trial56 but, given the rigmarole just described, a trial never 
occurred. 
So, despite over a decade of litigation, courts have yet to 
definitively decide the substantive question of whether state public 
nuisance claims may be premised on direct or indirect GHG 
emissions. After both the Supreme Court ruling in AEP and the 
Ninth Circuit ruling in Kivalina, the plaintiffs declined to pursue 
any remaining claims in state court,57 and the Comer precedent is 
 
51. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 866 (Pro, J., concurring). 
52. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 852–53.  
53. Comer I, 562 U.S. at 1133. 
54. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 855–57. 
55. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 878–79.  
56. Id. at 880. 
57. Adam Wernick, Will These Alaska Villagers Be America’s First Climate 
Change Refugees?, PUBLIC RADIO INT’L (Aug. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/W7UJ-
GMHH. 
11
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inconclusive. The current wave of California public nuisance 
lawsuits could open a significant new chapter in climate change 
litigation by forcing courts to address the merits of state public 
nuisance law–or they may never get there. 
III. PRELIMINARY DEFENSES 
At the time of this writing, defendants had successfully 
removed the San Francisco Bay lawsuits to federal court and 
prevailed on a motion to dismiss after convincing the district court 
to analyze the claims under federal common law rather than state 
law.58 Meanwhile, plaintiffs had successfully moved to remand the 
San Mateo, Marin, Imperial Beach, Santa Cruz, and Richmond 
cases to state court, persuading another judge in the same district 
court that state common law should govern the cases.59 The result 
is that there are conflicting opinions within the Northern District 
of California on whether federal or state law applies. This Part 
describes and assesses the merits of some of the most visible 
preliminary defenses, including those already raised in support of 
removal and dismissal. 
A. Existence of a State-Based Common Law Claim for 
Nuisance 
Perhaps the most important threshold question confronting all 
of the California cases is whether state public nuisance and other 
common law claims for abatement and/or damages resulting from 
climate change are available. In the San Francisco Bay lawsuits, 
defendants successfully argued that the local governments’ claims, 
though styled as state common law claims, are necessarily federal 
common law claims.60 Originally, defendants offered two slightly 
different arguments. First, they argued that courts have 
recognized a federal common law public nuisance claim for climate 
change and, therefore, there can be no state common law public 
nuisance claim.61 Second, they argued that the cases involve 
 
58. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2. 
59. County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937; see also Order Granting 
Motions to Remand, County of Santa Cruz, No. 3:18-cv-00732-VC (July 10, 2018). 
60. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2.  
61. Notice of Removal at 19, California v. BP, No. 3:17-cv-06012-EMC (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 20, 2017) [hereinafter BP Notice of Removal]. 
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“uniquely federal interests” requiring the application of federal 
common law.62 The district court ruled in their favor, finding that: 
Plaintiffs’ claims for public nuisance, though pled as state-law 
claims, depend on a global complex of geophysical cause and 
effect involving all nations of the planet (and the oceans and 
atmosphere). It necessarily involves the relationships between 
the United States and all other nations. It demands to be 
governed by as universal a rule of apportioning responsibility as 
is available . . . [P]laintiffs’ claims, if any, are governed by federal 
common law.63 
While the question emerged in the removal context, the 
answer is important beyond the outcome of that particular battle. 
If all climate change public nuisance cases are federal, then it is 
possible that all of them could be dismissed out of hand, due to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in AEP that the Clean Air Act displaced 
federal common law suits against GHG emitters.64 Indeed, this is 
one of the key elements of the San Francisco Bay dismissal order.65 
But, the implications go even further. At the core of the argument 
against the existence of state public nuisance claims is the notion 
that common law has no proper role to play when it comes to 
climate change—whether it be in addressing the sources of GHG 
emissions or the adverse impacts that result from them—because 
all of it is wrapped up in federal policies pertaining to energy, 
economy, security, and appropriate levels of air pollution control, 
a complex web of national and foreign affairs concerns governed by 
congressional statutes and executive branch authority. Though 
clever in its confusions, our analysis concludes that the argument 
against the existence of state common law should not, in the end, 
prevail. 
1. The Argument from Precedent 
One argument defendants marshaled in support of limiting 
common law climate change litigation to federal common law went, 
in essence, like this: (1) Courts in AEP and Kivalina have 
 
62. Id. at 3. 
63. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *5.  
64. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.  
65. Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–26. 
13
  
62 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 36 
recognized the existence of a federal common law cause of action 
for public nuisance;66 (2) These and other judicial opinions have 
made statements to the effect that there cannot be a federal 
common law cause of action and a state common law cause of action 
that apply to the same matter;67 (3) Therefore, there is only a 
federal common law cause of action for the nuisance of climate 
change.68 
However, as the district court found in the San Mateo remand 
order, precedent runs directly counter to the conclusion that only 
federal law can apply to climate change public nuisance claims.69 
Indeed, prior to the San Francisco Bay removal order, every court 
that looked at the question of the viability of state-based nuisance 
and tort claims for climate change came to the opposite 
conclusion.70 The Supreme Court’s view is that the existence of a 
federal common law claim that has been displaced by federal 
legislation does not erase the possibility of state common law 
claims; rather, it converts the availability of state claims into a 
question of statutory preemption.71 Thus, in her opinion for a 
unanimous court in AEP, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that, 
in addition to their federal common law public nuisance claims, 
plaintiffs had also pled state common law claims for nuisance 
under the laws of various states in which emitting sources were 
located.72 Regarding the viability of those claims, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote: 
 In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal 
common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, 
inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act . . . None of 
the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the 
 
66. BP Notice of Removal, supra note 61, at 5–11. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 4, 7–10. 
69. County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937–38. 
70. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.  
71. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327–29 (1981) (noting the 
Clean Water Act preserved state common law cause of action in an area previously 
governed by federal common law). 
72. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429. 
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availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore 
leave the matter open for consideration on remand.73 
In regards to the supplemental state law claims filed in 
Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit panel noted simply that the district 
court had declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and 
dismissed the claim without prejudice to re-file in state court.74 
Below, the district court had explained its decision by stating that 
a federal court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction.”75 In at least one judge’s view, then, a federal district 
court does not have original jurisdiction over a case claiming a 
state common law nuisance for climate change-related harm. 
This view is consistent with the Fifth Circuit panel’s 2009 
opinion in Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I)76 and the District Court 
for the Southern District of Mississippi’s decision three years later 
in the next Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II),77 the only other 
decisions to address the question of jurisdiction in this context. In 
Comer I, plaintiffs seeking damages for injuries suffered as a result 
of Hurricane Katrina had invoked federal jurisdiction based on 
diversity of citizenship.78 The Fifth Circuit panel concurred, 
reasoning that it had original jurisdiction over a class action worth 
more than $5 million where diversity of the parties is present.79 
That the Fifth Circuit later vacated the decision is of no moment, 
as the decision to do so was based on its failure to convene a 
quorum for an en banc rehearing.80 This had the effect of 
reinstating the district court’s dismissal of the case on political 
question and standing grounds.81 The district court dismissed the 
largely identical complaint filed in Comer II on several grounds: 
 
73. Id. The district court in the San Francisco Bay lawsuits, while denying 
the motion to remand, quoted Justice Ginsburg’s opinion on this point in 
acknowledging that “AEP did not reach the plaintiffs’ state law claims.” 
California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 
429). 
74. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854–55.  
75. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882.  
76. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 878–79.  
77. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 865. 
78. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 859–61. 
79. Id. at 860 n.1. 
80. Comer I, 607 F.3d at 1055. 
81. Id. 
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res judicata, political question, standing, and preemption.82 The 
Fifth Circuit upheld dismissal based on res judicata.83 None of the 
foregoing supports the idea that state law claims do not exist. 
Instead, the Comer cases appear to validate the existence of the 
claims, even while doing away with them before reaching the 
merits. 
In short, we agree with the holding of the San Mateo remand 
order that precedent plainly clears the pathway for state common 
law claims, even if they may eventually be dismissed on 
preemption or other grounds.84 
2. The Argument from Federal Interests 
Defendants’ argument that there are “uniquely federal 
interests” at issue in the latest climate change cases derives from 
the authority the Supreme Court has declared for courts to create 
and apply federal common law where a lawsuit implicates 
“uniquely federal interests.”85 The Supreme Court has described 
these cases as those “narrow areas [that are] . . . concerned with 
the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and 
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States 
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”86 In 
seeking to convert the plaintiff governments’ claims into federal 
common law claims, defendants posited that climate change is both 
an issue concerning the rights and obligations of the United States 
and a matter implicating foreign relations.87 
The first argument re-styles the political question doctrine as 
a constraint on state law rather than federal courts and, if 
endorsed by the courts, could empower federal common law to hold 
domain over a broad swath of policy areas that touch on energy, 
environment, and natural resources. The political question 
doctrine limits federal courts’ jurisdiction by delineating certain 
cases as nonjusticiable, based on a number of factors.88 The 
 
82. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 855–66. 
83. Comer II, 718 F.3d at 466–69. 
84. County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937. 
85. E.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
86. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) 
(citations omitted). 
87. See BP Notice of Removal, supra note 61, at 9–11. 
88. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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“uniquely federal interests” doctrine, by contrast, vests federal 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over certain cases involving “the 
rights and obligations of the United States.”89 The category of cases 
where courts have found “the rights and obligations of the United 
States” to be sufficiently at stake to warrant the exclusive 
application of federal common law is highly circumscribed. It 
applies only when the United States is a party to an action, such 
as a contract dispute where the United States is a party to the 
contract.90 Although the defendants in the California cases were in 
some instances operating pursuant to federal licenses and permits, 
and their production and sale of fossil fuels were arguably 
consistent with domestic energy policy preferences, the United 
States was and is not a party to the defendants’ actions. 
The argument that climate change involves “disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with 
foreign nations” sufficient to require a uniform federal rule was 
found persuasive by the district court in the San Francisco Bay 
lawsuits.91 In its removal order, the district court declared 
“[t]aking the complaints at face value, the scope of the worldwide 
predicament demands the most comprehensive view available, 
which in our American court system means our federal courts and 
our federal common law. A patchwork of fifty different answers to 
the same fundamental global issue would be unworkable.”92 Even 
more directly, the district court stated “the transboundary problem 
of global warming raises exactly the sort of federal interests that 
necessitate a uniform solution.”93 
This line of reasoning recalls the argument offered by EPA in 
2003, when it denied a petition to regulate GHGs from motor 
vehicles because, among other things, doing so “might impair the 
President’s ability to negotiate with ‘key developing nations’ to 
reduce emissions.”94 The Supreme Court rejected the idea that 
vague allusions to foreign affairs could justify EPA’s decision not 
 
89. Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. 
90. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519; Diane P. Wood, Back to the Basics of Erie, 18 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 673, 687–89 (2014). 
91. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2–3 (quoting Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 
641). 
92. Id. at *3.  
93. Id.  
94. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). 
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to exercise its statutory authority then,95 and courts should reject 
the argument that similar allusions could foreclose the availability 
of state common law claims now. This prong of the “uniquely 
federal interests” analysis has, like the “rights and obligations of 
the United States” prong, been applied in a far narrower set of 
cases. In particular, courts have determined that cases involving 
questions of international law, the Act of State doctrine, or 
competing interests of states in their sovereign capacity may 
require federal common law.96 
None of these apply here. First, it is implausible that courts in 
the United States will treat climate change as a matter bound by 
and confined to international law. Although climate change is the 
subject of international agreements, those agreements do not 
preclude subnational efforts to address the problem (in fact, such 
efforts are encouraged), nor do they purport to address the liability 
of nonstate actors.  Second, the Act of State doctrine—which 
concerns acts done by a foreign government within its own 
territory—is irrelevant to these nuisance cases against fossil fuel 
companies.97 Third, the states are already undertaking extensive 
efforts to address climate change, both independently and in small 
groups.98 The present cases simply do not involve a conflict 
between states in their sovereign capacity, such as interstate 
disputes over boundaries or water apportionment.99 
In our view, it is not the case that there is only one kind of 
public nuisance action that applies to climate change and its 
related harms, and that the action is a federal one. The case law 
addressing the issue is overwhelmingly to the contrary, and the 
expansion of the “uniquely federal interests” test to cover climate 
change is untenable. If the state common law claims are to fail, it 
should be on a basis other than that they simply do not exist. 
 
95. Id. at 533–34. 
96. Wood, supra note 90, at 692–95.  
97. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The act 
of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country 
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign 
power committed within its own territory.”). 
98. See U.S. State Climate Action Plans, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, https://perma.cc/46DW-KR6C. 
99. See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 
100 NW. U.L. REV. 585, 596–99 (2006). 
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B. Separation of Powers and the Political Question 
Doctrine 
The separation of powers issues implicated by the California 
public nuisance cases have emerged in a number of different, often 
blended forms, which evoke the political question doctrine, foreign 
policy preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, and other 
concepts. For the purpose of analytic simplicity, here we address 
arguments against justiciability based on the political question 
doctrine, which encompasses many, if not necessarily all, of the 
related concepts. 
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court enumerated six factors 
or “formulations” that may indicate to federal courts the existence 
of a non-justiciable political question: 
 Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or 
[(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.100 
In AEP, the federal district court originally found that the case 
raised a political question necessarily left for the political branches 
because it required an initial policy determination of a nonjudicial 
kind.101 The Second Circuit reversed this judgment, finding that 
courts have long adjudicated complex environmental nuisance 
cases, and that the political question doctrine did not pose a bar.102 
The Supreme Court’s view of the matter is somewhat obscure. 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her opinion that “[f]our members of the 
Court” found that neither standing nor any “other threshold 
 
100. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  
101. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 419.  
102. Id.  
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obstacle bars review.”103 A footnote in the opinion refers to the 
political question doctrine,104 but neither the footnote nor the text 
offers an explanation of exactly how the justices voted on the 
matter. All of which leaves the political question issue, as it applies 
to a federal common law claim seeking an injunction against GHG 
emissions, unresolved at the highest level. 
The facts of the California cases, however, are different. 
Plaintiffs have framed their cases not in relation to climate change 
mitigation policy but rather in relation to these private actors’ 
individual and collective conduct, which includes not only 
producing GHG emissions, but also interacting with the market 
and with regulators in a sustained disinformation campaign.105 
Plaintiffs are not seeking to establish a specific policy in regards to 
GHG emissions, public lands management, or other matters of 
federal agency discretion. Rather, they are seeking abatement and 
damages for harms caused by market behavior they claim was, 
among other things, knowing, negligent, and intentionally 
misleading.106 Thus, the analysis in federal court should, in theory, 
differ. 
If the cases are remanded to state court, or if state law is 
applied in federal court, the political question doctrine would 
appear inapplicable. Under California law, the political question 
doctrine “compels dismissal of a lawsuit when complete deference 
to the role of the legislative or executive branch is required and 
there is nothing upon which a court can adjudicate without 
impermissibly intruding upon the authority of another branch of 
government.”107 These conditions do not apply to the plaintiffs’ 
claims, which are based on the common law and do not threaten to 
intrude on the authority of the legislature or the executive branch.  
Likewise, in Comer I, the Fifth Circuit panel conducted an 
extensive analysis and held that the political question doctrine did 
not bar state nuisance claims.108 The political question doctrine 
 
103. Id. at 420.  
104. Id. at 420 n.6. 
105. See, e.g., SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 41–49. 
106. See supra notes 21 – 23 and accompanying text.  
107. Schabarum v. California Legislature, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 750 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
108. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 875–76.   
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does not appear to be intended to apply to actions invoking state 
common law claims. 
C. Federal Displacement and Statutory Preemption 
In AEP, the Supreme Court found that a public nuisance case 
brought in federal court under federal common law had been 
displaced by the Clean Air Act.109 Because the Court had 
previously held in Massachusetts v. EPA that EPA was authorized 
to regulate GHGs by federal legislation,110 there was no longer 
room for federal common law. In the San Francisco Bay dismissal 
order, the district court found that this precedent controlled to the 
extent the federal nuisance claims involved defendants’ domestic 
activities.111 If state nuisance cases are converted into federal 
ones, one might expect this result to repeat. By contrast, in the San 
Mateo remand order, the district court noted that in AEP “the 
Supreme Court noted that the question of whether such state law 
claims survived would depend on whether they are preempted by 
the federal statute that had displaced federal common law (a 
question the Court did not resolve),” and that “[t]his seems to 
reflect the Court’s view that once federal common law is displaced 
by a federal statute, there is no longer a possibility that state law 
claims could be superseded by the previously-operative federal 
common law.”112 
It remains an open question whether state claims, such as 
those pled in the California cases, are preempted by federal 
legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Mineral Leasing Act, 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and other statutes setting 
federal policies for GHG emissions and fossil fuel extraction, 
transportation, and consumption.113 Notably, in the San Mateo 
remand order, the district court found that the claims were not 
removable on the basis of “complete preemption,” as defendants did 
not point to any statutory provision that would implicate such 
 
109. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424. 
110. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.  
111. Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024. 
112. San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937. 
113. In Comer I, a Fifth Circuit panel concluded that federal preemption was 
inapplicable to plaintiffs’ state common law claims because there was no federal 
legislation barring state suits. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 879–80.  
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preemption.114 The court also noted that “[t]here may be important 
questions of ordinary preemption, but those are for the state courts 
to decide upon remand.”115 
Courts’ analyses of ordinary preemption of state common law, 
should they reach the issue, may rest on North Carolina v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), in which the Fourth Circuit 
dismissed a common law nuisance action brought by the state of 
North Carolina against TVA.116 The lawsuit focused on emissions 
from TVA-operated power plants in Alabama and Tennessee, 
which were alleged to cause air pollution and associated health 
problems in North Carolina.117 The Fourth Circuit held that North 
Carolina plaintiffs could not seek redress under North Carolina 
law for defendants’ out-of-state activities and that, even if the 
plaintiffs had brought public nuisance claims under Alabama or 
Tennessee law, those claims would have failed because the 
defendants’ facilities held valid permits to emit pollutants.118 The 
court reasoned that the defendants could not be held liable under 
state public nuisance for the same interstate polluting activities 
covered by the permits, noting that “[c]ourts traditionally have 
been reluctant to enjoin as a public nuisance activities which have 
been considered and specifically authorized by the government.”119 
The Third and Sixth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion. 
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the Third Circuit held that 
Pennsylvania plaintiffs could seek damages under Pennsylvania 
law for “ash and contaminants settling on their property,” even 
though those pollutants had come from facilities permitted to emit 
under the Clean Air Act.120 In Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, 
Inc., a case dealing with fungus growing on plaintiffs’ property as 
 
114. San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937–38. 
115. Id. at 938. 
116. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 312 (4th Cir. 2010). 
117. Id. at 296. 
118. Id. at 308–09.  
119. Id. at 309 (quoting New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 
33 (2d Cir. 1981)). The court held that the emissions from the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s 11 coal-fired power plants “cannot logically be public nuisances under 
Alabama and Tennessee law where TVA is in compliance with EPA NAAQS, the 
corresponding state SIPs, and the permits that implement them.” Id. at 310. 
120. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 189, 197 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he suit here, brought by Pennsylvania residents under Pennsylvania 
law against a source of pollution located in Pennsylvania, is not preempted.”). 
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a result of emissions from defendant’s whiskey distillery,121 and in 
Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,122 a case closely resembling Bell 
v. Cheswick, the Sixth Circuit found that courts “distinguish[] 
between claims based on the common law of the source state—
which are not preempted by the Clean Air Act—and claims based 
on the common law of a non-source state—which are preempted by 
the Clean Air Act.”123 
Even if the reasoning of North Carolina v. TVA were correct, 
there is at least one key distinction between it and the California 
cases: the facilities in TVA were specifically permitted to pollute 
under the standards set through the Clean Air Act, and the 
permits in question authorized the pollution in question. Here, by 
contrast, few of the federal programs through which defendants 
have operated, and few of the foreign governments that have 
permitted them to operate in other jurisdictions, have, until recent 
years, considered or disclosed, far less sought to regulate, the 
downstream GHG emissions associated with their activities.124 
Although defendants have already raised preemption-like issues 
on other, non-Clean Air Act grounds, the preemptive effect of those 
statutes remains to be seen. 
D. Standing 
Standing is a question that comes up in most climate change 
lawsuits, and it is a threshold issue in any challenge to government 
action, or inaction, in the climate change arena. But, the California 
cases involve common law tort claims. The elements of standing–
injury, causation, redressability–constitute the merits of the 
case.125 Were plaintiffs harmed in a tortious manner? Did 
defendants cause that harm? Are plaintiffs entitled to abatement? 
 
121. Merrick v. Diageo Am. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“The states’ rights savings clause of the Clean Air Act expressly preserves the 
state common law standards on which plaintiffs sue.”). 
122. Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 805 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 2015). 
123. Merrick, 805 F.3d at 693. 
124. See Michael Burger and Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream 
Emissions Analysis: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
109 (2017). 
125. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of 
Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1248—49 (2011) (noting that the standing 
analysis involves many assumptions and speculation, fact-intensive inquiry, 
competing experts, and weighing of evidence). 
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Those questions constitute the whole case, not a preliminary 
matter to determine justiciability. In such circumstances where 
the standing and merits inquiries overlap, a plaintiff need not 
prove its case in order to avoid dismissal on standing grounds; 
rather, a case should be dismissed only if “entirely frivolous” or 
having “no foundation in law.”126 
Standing was an issue in AEP. In her opinion, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that “[f]our members of the Court would hold that 
at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing.”127 Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor did not participate in that decision, meaning, it is safe 
to assume, that Justice Anthony Kennedy voted to uphold his own 
opinion from Massachusetts v. EPA, which found that 
Massachusetts had standing to sue due to harm suffered from sea 
level rise associated with global warming.128 (That opinion, 
importantly, relied on the “special solicitude” owed states due to 
their quasi-sovereign status.129). Given Justice Kennedy’s 
retirement, it is unknown whether there will be five votes for the 
broad proposition that states have standing to sue for climate 
change, in either a regulatory or common law context, or whether 
the Court will reverse that core holding from Massachusetts. 
The Fifth Circuit squarely addressed the issue of whether non-
state plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring a state public 
nuisance claim in Comer I. The court noted that there was no 
question that the plaintiffs satisfied the injury-in-fact and 
redressability requirements, as they alleged specific harm and 
sought damages to compensate for the harm.130 The court held that 
it was not appropriate to rule on causation at the motion to dismiss 
stage, because it “essentially calls upon us to evaluate the merits 
of plaintiffs’ causes of action, [and] is misplaced at this threshold 
standing stage of the litigation.”131 
The Fifth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs in Comer I 
“easily satisf[ied] Mississippi’s ‘liberal standing requirements.’”132 
 
126. Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
141 F.3d 364, 367–68 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
127. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 420.  
128. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–27. 
129. Id. at 520. 
130. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 863–64. 
131. Id. at 864. 
132. Id. at 862 (quoting Van Slyke v. Bd. Tr’s of State Inst. of Higher 
Learning, 613 So.2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993)). 
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If any of the California cases proceed under state law, state 
standing requirements will apply, regardless of whether they 
proceed in state or federal court (though Article III requirements 
will also apply if they proceed in federal court).133 In contrast to 
the United States Constitution, however, neither the California 
Constitution nor California case law imposes a “case or 
controversy” requirement.134 Rather, California courts generally 
may hear “a suit by a citizen in the undifferentiated public 
interest.”135 California law does require a plaintiff to have a cause 
of action in his own right and to pursue it in his own name, but 
courts have declined to characterize these requirements of 
substantive law in terms of standing.136 
IV. SUBSTANCE OF THE PUBLIC NUISANCE 
CLAIMS 
Assuming that the plaintiffs can overcome the preliminary 
defenses, proving the substance of the public nuisance claims will 
be challenging. Nonetheless, the defendants face some 
vulnerability to liability under California public nuisance law, 
which will be the focus of this Part. Moreover, although AEP would 
seem to cast doubt on the availability of a federal public nuisance 
claim, the factual differences between the claims here and the 
claims asserted in AEP suggest that federal public nuisance law 
merits some attention as well. 
A. California Public Nuisance Law 
California law defines a nuisance as: 
 
 
133. See Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host 
Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Where, as here, jurisdiction is predicated 
on diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III 
of the Constitution and applicable state law in order to maintain a cause of 
action.”).  
134. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Assn. v. California, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
135. Id. 
136. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432–
37 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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Anything which is injurious to health, . . . or is indecent or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life 
or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in 
the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, 
stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or 
highway[.]137 
A private nuisance involves interference with use or 
enjoyment of private property, whereas a public nuisance involves 
interference with public rights or use of public property.138 While 
the exact contours of public nuisance doctrine vary by jurisdiction, 
public nuisance generally includes the following elements: “(1) an 
unreasonable and substantial interference (2) with a public right 
(3) where the defendant has control of the instrumentality causing 
the nuisance[,]”139 or where the defendant created or assisted in 
creating the nuisance.140 
At common law, public rights subject to public nuisance 
included rights to unobstructed highways and waterways, as well 
as rights to unpolluted air and water.141 Many states define public 
nuisance by statute and thereby incorporate a broad notion of 
public rights.142 In California, a public nuisance is a nuisance that 
“affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or 
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the 
annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be 
unequal.”143 An interference with public rights is substantial if it 
causes significant harm and unreasonable if the gravity of the 
harm inflicted outweighs the social utility of the activity at 
issue.144 Unlike in some other jurisdictions, “liability for nuisance 
 
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2016). 
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821D. 
139. See Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public 
Nuisance to Compel Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 974 (2010). 
140. City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 
872 (Ct. App. 2004). 
141. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,  951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008) (describing 
public right); see DOBBS, supra note 36, at 1335; Donald G. Gifford, Public 
Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 815 (2003) 
(describing fact patterns constituting public nuisance under common law). 
142. See DOBBS, supra note 36, at 1334. 
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480.  
144. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325. 
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[in California] does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, 
possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a 
position to abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the 
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”145 
A California municipality in which a public nuisance exists 
may bring a representative action in the name of the people of 
California to abate the nuisance.146 This first type of public 
nuisance claim traces back to the common law use of public 
nuisance by the state to enjoin an ongoing harm.147 California law 
also authorizes a second type of public nuisance claim: any person, 
including a public entity, who has a property interest “injuriously 
affected” by a nuisance may seek injunctive relief, abatement, or 
damages.148 This second, non-representative, type of claim reflects 
the common law rule allowing private persons to bring a public 
nuisance action if they have suffered special injury.149 If the special 
injury involves interference with the use and enjoyment of land, 
this public nuisance claim may overlap with a private nuisance 
claim.150 
Public nuisance actions were typically aimed at parties whose 
conduct directly created the nuisance condition, such as a facility 
emitting pollution or a person blocking a waterway with refuse.151 
In recent years, public nuisance actions also have been brought 
against product manufacturers to address harms associated with 
use of their products by a third party. These lawsuits, which lay 
 
145. Id. (quoting Modesto Redev. Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872). 
146. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 2015). 
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmts. a & b (noting early 
history of nuisance as “an infringement of the rights of the Crown” and 
subsequently as “a large, miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal 
offenses, all of which involved some interference with the interests of the 
community at large”); id. § 821C cmt. a (“The original remedies for a public 
nuisance were a prosecution for a criminal offense or a suit to abate or enjoin the 
nuisance brought by or on behalf of the state or an appropriate subdivision by the 
proper public authority.”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 
§ 90, at 643 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing usual remedies of “criminal prosecution and 
abatement by way of in injunctive decree or order”). 
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731. 
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (allowing private 
plaintiff who has “suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other 
members of the public” to recover damages for public nuisance). 
150. See id. § 821C(1) cmt. e (noting potential overlap between public 
nuisance and private nuisance actions); see also id. § 821B cmt. h. 
151. See DOBBS, supra note 36, at 1334–35, 1338. 
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the foundation for the climate change public nuisance actions, are 
discussed below. 
B. Lead Paint Litigation 
Among the public nuisance cases brought against product 
manufacturers, litigation against manufacturers of lead paint has 
been particularly prominent. Two California appellate court 
opinions are especially significant to the climate change cases. 
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., a 2006 pre-trial 
opinion, recognized that public nuisance can apply to a defendant’s 
past activity that contributes to a present nuisance.152 Atlantic 
Richfield opened the door to holding product manufacturers liable 
for abating a public nuisance based on their past promotion of a 
hazardous product.153 A 2017 post-trial opinion in the same 
litigation, People v. Conagra, clarified the elements of a public 
nuisance claim in California while largely upholding a trial verdict 
against the paint manufacturers.154 
The California lead paint litigation began with allegations by 
a group of government entities that the presence of lead in homes 
and buildings throughout the state constituted a public 
nuisance.155 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants had 
contributed to the nuisance by promoting the use of lead paint and 
failing to warn about its hazards notwithstanding their knowledge 
of lead’s dangers.156 Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs filed 
both a representative public nuisance action seeking abatement 
and a non-representative public nuisance action seeking 
damages.157 
After the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer, the 
appellate court in Atlantic Richfield reversed in part and held that 
the plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with the representative 
 
152. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 329. 
153. Id.  
154. People v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 551–52 
(Ct. App. 2017). 
155. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324. 
156. Id. at 324–25, 328. 
157. Id. at 324, 331. 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
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public nuisance action for abatement.158 The appellate court’s 
analysis focused on whether the defendants created or assisted in 
the creation of a nuisance.159 As the court noted, the plaintiffs did 
not merely allege that the defendants had produced a defective 
product or failed to warn of a defective product.160 While such 
allegations might support a product liability action, they would not 
suffice to establish a nuisance.161 The plaintiffs’ complaint went 
further, however, asserting that the defendants had affirmatively 
created or assisted in creating a widespread public health hazard 
by “promot[ing] lead paint for interior use with knowledge of the 
hazard that such use would create.”162 These allegations were 
central to the court’s rejection of the defendants’ argument that the 
plaintiffs were disguising a products liability claim as a nuisance 
action. As the court explained, the alleged conduct was “far more 
egregious than simply producing a defective product or failing to 
warn of a defective product”; rather, it was akin “to instructing the 
purchaser to use the product in a hazardous manner”—conduct 
that would result in nuisance liability.163 
The court was less receptive to the non-representative public 
nuisance claim, which sought damages for special injury rather 
than abatement.164 This cause of action, the court explained, “is 
much more like a products liability cause of action because it is, at 
its core, an action for damages for injuries caused to plaintiffs’ 
property by a product, while the core of the representative cause of 
action is an action for remediation of a public health hazard.”165 
Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the dismissal of the non-
representative public nuisance claim.166 
 
158. Id. at 330. In California, a demurrer may seek dismissal of a plaintiff’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 430.10(e). 
159. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325. 
160. Id. at 328. 
161. Id. 
162. Id.; see also id. (“A public nuisance cause of action is not premised on a 
defect in a product or a failure to warn but on affirmative conduct that assisted 
in the creation of a hazardous condition.”).  
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 331. 
165. Id.  
166. Id. 
29
  
78 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 36 
The subsequent bench trial on the representative public 
nuisance action resulted in an order that the defendants establish 
a $1.15 billion abatement fund.167 The trial court found that the 
defendants promoted lead paint with constructive, if not actual, 
knowledge that using lead paint would create a hazard.168 
Applying the substantial factor approach to causation, the court 
held three of the corporate defendants jointly and severally liable 
for the public nuisance.169 
On appeal, the court held in People v. Conagra that substantial 
evidence did not support causation as to residences built after 
1950.170 The court of appeals noted that the defendants stopped 
promoting lead paint for interior residential use after that date and 
ordered the trial court to recalculate the amount of the abatement 
fund accordingly.171 However, the bulk of the trial court’s judgment 
was upheld, including its finding that the defendants had actual 
knowledge of the hazard during the time they promoted lead 
paint.172 
The plaintiffs also prevailed on several issues relevant to 
climate change public nuisance litigation. First, the appellate court 
rejected defendants’ argument that lead paint in private 
residences did not interfere with a public right: 
Residential housing, like water, electricity, natural gas, and 
sewer services, is an essential community resource. Indeed, 
without residential housing, it would be nearly impossible for the 
“public” to obtain access to water, electricity, gas, and sewer 
 
167. People v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823, 
at *61 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014). 
168. Id. at *8–10, *25.  
169. Id. at *46, *61. 
170. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 546–47.  
171. Id. at 546, 598. 
172. Id. at 529–34.  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected defendants’ petition for 
writ of certiorari to review the decision.  Conagra Grocery Prods. Co. v. Cal., 139 
S. Ct. 377 (2018); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Cal., 139 S. Ct. 378 (2018). The lead 
paint manufacturers also proposed but later withdrew a ballot measure to 
approve a $2 billion bond to pay for lead paint abatement, for which the 
manufacturers would otherwise be responsible, and to declare lead paint not to 
be a public nuisance. See Liam Dillon, Paint Companies Pull Lead Cleanup 
Measure from California’s November Ballot, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/5ER9-7X39; California Lead Paint Liability Initiative Heads to 
Ballot, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/N3G5-EEHH. 
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services. Pervasive lead exposure in residential housing 
threatens the public right to essential community resources.173 
Second, the court rejected the assertion that the abatement 
order constituted “nothing more than a thinly-disguised damage 
award . . . for unattributed past harm[.]”174 In the court’s view, the 
abatement order did not award any costs that the plaintiffs had 
already expended on lead remediation; rather, the order 
established an abatement fund to be used solely for funding 
prospective remediation efforts.175 Characterizing the difference 
“between an abatement order and a damages award [a]s stark,” the 
court observed that an abatement order is an equitable remedy 
whose “sole purpose is to eliminate the hazard that is causing 
prospective harm to the plaintiff,” whereas damages “are directed 
at compensating the plaintiff for prior accrued harm[.]”176 Finally, 
the court distinguished public nuisance decisions from other 
jurisdictions in which lead paint manufacturers had prevailed, 
noting that “a defendant’s control of the nuisance is not necessary 
to establish liablity in a representative public nuisance action in 
California.”177 
Indeed, the California opinions represent a marked departure 
from rulings in other jurisdictions, where similar efforts to invoke 
public nuisance have been rejected. Most notably, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court stepped in to overturn a verdict—the first of its 
kind in the United States—that had imposed liability on lead paint 
manufacturers under a public nuisance theory.178 Because 
“defendants were not in control of any lead pigment at the time the 
lead caused harm,” the court held, they were “unable to abate the 
alleged nuisance,” and state “public nuisance law simply does not 
provide a remedy for this harm.”179 The requirement that 
defendants have control over the instrumentality creating the 
nuisance when the harm occurs—an element absent from 
 
173. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552. 
174. Id. at 568. 
175. Id. at 569. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 594. 
178. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 434, 480. 
179. Id. at 435. 
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California law—was pivotal to the decision.180 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court reached a similar result in rejecting various 
municipalities’ public nuisance claims for damages against paint 
manufacturers.181 Explaining that the plaintiffs’ claims “sound in 
products liability causes of action” rather than public nuisance, the 
New Jersey court took note of a state statute that declared lead 
paint to be a nuisance and focused on the conduct of the premises 
owner.182 In the climate change public nuisance cases, the 
defendants will likely raise concerns similar to the Rhode Island 
high court’s worry “over the ease with which a plaintiff could bring 
what properly would be characterized as a products liability suit 
under the guise of product-based public nuisance.”183 
C. PCB Litigation 
Efforts to apply the California lead paint decisions to other 
instances of environmental pollution are now working their way 
through the courts. Most notably, a number of West Coast cities 
have asserted public nuisance claims to address polychlorinated 
biphenyl (“PCB”) contamination.184 The underlying theory in each 
of these cases is that Monsanto, which manufactured and sold 
products containing PCBs, should be liable for cleaning up PCBs 
that wound up in the environment as a result of, or after, the use 
of those products.185 While these cases have yet to be fully litigated, 
the rulings to date hold some promise for plaintiffs bringing 
climate change public nuisance claims. 
In City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co., three San Francisco Bay 
Area cities allege that ongoing contamination of San Francisco Bay 
 
180. Id. at 449–50. The court’s ruling also rested on its determination that 
the asserted “right to be free from the hazards of unabated lead” did not qualify 
as “a public right as that term traditionally has been understood in the law of 
public nuisance.” Id. at 453. 
181. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499–502 (N.J. 2007). 
182. Id. at 492–503. In addition, the New Jersey litigation was an action for 
damages rather than abatement. Id. at 502. 
183. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 456; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 
A.2d at 505. 
184. See Peter Hayes, Public Nuisance PCB Suits Against Monsanto Could 
Have Far-Reaching Impact, 31 TOXICS L. RPTR. 285 (2016).  
185. See id. 
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has forced them to spend money to reduce PCB discharge.186 The 
plaintiffs rely on a non-representative public nuisance claim, 
which requires them to demonstrate “a property interest 
injuriously affected by the nuisance.”187 The district court initially 
rejected the cities’ contention that stormwater polluted by the 
defendants’ PCBs constituted such an interest.188 However, the 
California legislature subsequently enacted a law granting local 
entities a right to use captured stormwater, prompting the court to 
reverse its initial ruling.189 Further, the court found sufficient 
allegations of a causal connection between Monsanto’s actions and 
the asserted nuisance, based on the cities’ assertion that 
“Monsanto knew that PCBs were dangerous, concealed that 
knowledge, promoted the use of PCBs in a range of applications, 
and gave disposal instructions that were likely to cause 
environmental contamination.”190 
PCB contamination of San Diego Bay has led to public 
nuisance litigation raising representative and non-representative 
claims. In contrast to Atlantic Richfield, where the court dismissed 
the non-representative public nuisance claim because of its overlap 
with products liability law,191 both types of claims have survived 
motions to dismiss.192 The district court in San Diego v. Monsanto 
specifically found that the non-representative public nuisance 
 
186. City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co., 231 F. Supp. 3d 357, 360–61 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017). 
187. Id. at 361. 
188. Id. at 360–61 (noting earlier ruling that stormwater is public water 
belonging to the state). 
189. Id. at 362.  
190. Id. at 363–64. The litigation has since been stayed pending 
administrative proceedings in which the cities seek reimbursement from the state 
of California for the costs of retrofitting their stormwater systems to filter out 
PCBs. Order Further Staying Case; Continuing Status Conference, City of San 
Jose v. Monsanto Co., No. 5:15–cv–03178–EJD, No. 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, No. 5:16-
cv-00071-EJD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018) (further staying case and continuing 
status conference until February 2019); City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co, 2017 
WL 3335735, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
191. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313. 
192. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Monsanto Co., No.15-cv-578-WQH-JLB, 
2016 WL 5464551, at *4–8 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that the port district has the 
authority to bring a representative public nuisance action for abatement); City of 
San Diego v. Monsanto Co., No. 15-cv-578-WQH-AGS, 2017 WL 5632052, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. 2017) (allowing the city’s non-representative public nuisance action to 
proceed after concluding that the city had sufficiently alleged a property interest 
in its municipal stormwater system). 
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claim does not involve “a disguised products liability claim,” but 
rather aims at the “remediation of a public health hazard” and 
redress for harm to the city’s stormwater system.193 
Similar cases have also been brought against Monsanto 
outside California. The city and port of Portland, Oregon have 
alleged special injury from expending funds to investigate, 
monitor, analyze, and remediate PCB contamination.194 The State 
of Oregon has filed suit seeking abatement and damages for PCB 
contamination on lands and in waters owned, controlled, or held in 
trust by the state.195  Additionally, in Washington State, public 
nuisance claims by the cities of Seattle and Spokane have thus far 
survived motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district 
court in City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co. held that the city, as an 
owner of property abutting contaminated waterways and as the 
operator of wastewater and stormwater systems facilitating the 
migration of PCBs into the waterways, had alleged the necessary 
injury to bring a public nuisance claim.196 The court also found 
sufficient allegations of causation-in-fact and legal causation: the 
city had not only alleged that “Monsanto’s PCBs are the same 
PCBs that Seattle is paying to clean up,” but also that 
environmental harm from the routine use of PCBs was 
foreseeable.197 The district court in City of Spokane v. Monsanto 
Co. reached a similar conclusion.198 
Proving causation in the PCB cases may be easier than in the 
climate change cases. Monsanto was the sole manufacturer of 
 
193. City of San Diego, 2017 WL 5632052, at *7–8 (quoting Atlantic Richfield 
Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313). 
194. Port of Portland v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:17-cv-00015-PK, 2017 WL 
4236561, at *8 (D. Or. 2017). 
195. Complaint at 50, Oregon v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:18-cv-00238 (D. Or. 
Jan. 4, 2018); Jes Burns, Oregon Sues Monsanto For PCB Clean-Up Costs, OR. 
PUB. BROADCASTING (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/UYJ9-H6JL. 
196. City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 
2017). Washington law defines a public nuisance as “one which affects equally the 
rights of an entire community or neighborhood, although the extent of the damage 
may be unequal.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.130 (West 2017). Washington law 
authorizes a nuisance action “by any person whose property is . . . injuriously 
affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance” and a private 
action for public nuisance if it is “specially injurious” to the plaintiff. Id. at 
§§ 7.48.020, 7.48.210. 
197. City of Seattle, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07. 
198. City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016 WL 
6275164, at *7–9 (E.D. Wash. 2016). 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2
  
2018] Public Nuisance Claims & Climate Change 83 
PCBs in the United States, whereas multiple sources manufacture 
products whose use results in GHG emissions. Nonetheless, this 
distinction may be of little significance in California and other 
jurisdictions that impose tort liability under a substantial factor 
approach. 
D. Public Nuisance Suits Beyond Environmental 
Contamination 
Other product manufacturers that have been targeted in 
public nuisance actions include tobacco companies, gun 
manufacturers, and opioid manufacturers and distributors.199 
These cases have asserted harms to public health and safety and 
sought to recover costs expended by state and local governments in 
addressing those harms. The tobacco litigation, which revealed 
that the tobacco industry had manipulated nicotine levels and 
covered up the risks of smoking, was resolved through a 
multibillion dollar settlement.200 By contrast, public nuisance 
claims against gun manufacturers were almost uniformly 
unsuccessful, as courts found too attenuated the causal connection 
between the manufacture of guns and the expenses incurred by 
municipalities in responding to gun violence.201 The opioid public 
nuisance claims, now reflected in hundreds of lawsuits, appear to 
be patterned after the tobacco litigation and aimed at pressuring 
the defendants into settlement.202 
These efforts to expand public nuisance beyond the more 
limited settings to which public nuisance traditionally applied 
 
199. See Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 
31, 2017), https://perma.cc/W2WF-CTJX. 
200. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT 
INDUSTRIES 128–32, 175–76 (2010). 
201. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 133–36; see also Peter H. Schuck, Why 
Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A 
BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 225, 225–26 
(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005). Such suits were eventually barred with the passage 
of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in 2005. See Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 2–4, 119 Stat. 2095 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006)). 
202. See Jeanne Whalen & Sara Randazzo, Ohio Takes Steps Toward 
Resolution of Opioid Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9C6L-JEH3; Victor E. Schwartz et al., Deep Pocket 
Jurisprudence: Where Tort Law Should Draw the Line, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 359, 382–
87 (2018).  
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have prompted criticisms of such efforts as “unprincipled,”203 
“foreign to [public nuisance]’s historical context,”204 and “out of 
step with widely shared precepts about the proper assignment of 
roles among different legal institutions in our society.”205 Similar 
critiques are likely to be aimed at the climate change cases as well. 
E. Applying California Public Nuisance to Climate 
Change Litigation 
What do the various public nuisance cases portend for efforts 
to apply state public nuisance law to climate change? Courts in 
some states have been reluctant to hold product manufacturers 
liable under public nuisance for harms resulting from product use 
or misuse. However, as explained below, climate change 
defendants face risks of liability in California and perhaps other 
states that have incorporated broad conceptions of public nuisance. 
California law, as reflected in the lead paint decisions, 
interprets public nuisance to cover circumstances and conduct that 
fall outside the scope of public nuisance in some other states. In 
particular, Conagra emphasized that “[c]ontrol is not required in 
California for a public nuisance action, and California’s laws 
[unlike New Jersey law] do not assign exclusive responsibility for 
lead paint remediation to property owners.”206 Conagra similarly 
distinguished the Rhode Island lead paint decision as “based on 
lack of control (which does not apply in California) and lack of 
interference with a public right . . . [which] is not consistent with 
California’s broader statutory definition of a public nuisance.”207 
This Section discusses the application of public nuisance law 
to the California climate change lawsuits. The issues highlighted 
in Conagra—lack of control and definition of a public right—could 
prove determinative. 
 
203. Schwartz et al., supra note 202, at 388. 
204. GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 837. 
205. Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 5 (2011). 
206. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 594 (internal citation omitted). 
207. Id. 
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1. Control 
Courts that require control as a condition of liability have 
emphasized the importance of control at the time the damage 
occurs “because the principal remedy for the harm caused by 
[public] nuisance is abatement.”208 If the climate change cases are 
litigated on the merits, defendants likely will contend they cease 
to exert control over their products once the products are sold and 
thus should not be liable for abatement. Any interference with a 
public right, they may argue, arises from the burning of fossil fuels 
after control has already passed to consumers. 
However, California law does not require control of the 
instrumentality as an element of public nuisance. The Atlantic 
Richfield and Conagra decisions suggest that courts will deem the 
plaintiffs’ request for climate adaptation funding as an appropriate 
form of abatement.209 Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where 
control of the instrumentality is required, the Rhode Island and 
New Jersey lead paint decisions may be distinguishable in that the 
climate change cases involve a level of ongoing conduct and control 
that the lead paint cases do not. The San Francisco complaint, for 
example, alleges that the defendants continue to promote fossil 
fuels and doubts about global warming today despite 
overwhelming evidence of the dangers.210 
2. Causation 
While California law does not require control as an element of 
public nuisance, it does require causation—i.e., that “the 
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”211 
In public nuisance litigation against product manufacturers, 
establishing causation is a more manageable task than 
 
208. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 449. See also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 
A.2d at 499 (“[A] public entity which proceeds against the one in control of the 
nuisance may only seek to abate, at the expense of the one in control of the 
nuisance”). 
209. Cf. Kysar, supra note 30, at 27 (suggesting that in public nuisance 
actions “governmental plaintiffs may seek to style their prayer for relief as 
equitable in nature, even though it simply amounts to a request for monetary 
funds to reimburse public entities for climate change adaptation”).  
210. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 3, 41–48. 
211. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325 (quoting Modesto Redev. 
Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872). 
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demonstrating control. Causation requires proof of both causation-
in-fact as well as proximate cause.212 
Causation-in-fact is satisfied if the defendants’ conduct was a 
substantial factor in causing the nuisance.213 Here, the climate 
change plaintiffs will have to show: (1) that the defendants 
promoted the use of fossil fuels with knowledge of the hazard such 
use would create, and (2) that these promotional efforts played 
more than a negligible role in contributing to global warming-
induced sea level rise.214 The plaintiffs’ assertions—that 
defendants have known of the catastrophic risks posed by their 
fossil fuel products for decades and nonetheless promoted their 
widespread use through advertisements, campaigns to deny 
climate change, and efforts to emphasize the uncertainties of 
climate science215—appear sufficient to allege a causal connection. 
Whether courts would find the alleged conduct a substantial factor 
in causing the nuisance is less certain: while the defendants in the 
San Francisco complaint are alleged to be five of the nine “largest 
cumulative producers of fossil fuels worldwide from the mid 
nineteenth century to present[,]”216 they collectively appear 
responsible for approximately 7.4 percent of cumulative global 
GHG emissions, according to one methodology of tracing emissions 
to certain actors.217 
The second aspect of causation, proximate cause, presents 
uncertainties as well. Proximate cause is concerned “with the 
various considerations of policy that limit an actor’s responsibility 
for the consequences of his conduct.”218 A cause-in-fact may fall 
 
212. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545. 
213. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997). 
214. Cf. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325–28 (discussing public 
nuisance elements in context of lead paint litigation). 
215. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 41–49.  
216. Id. at 33. 
217. See Tess Riley, Just 100 Companies Responsible for 71% of Global 
Emissions, Study Says, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/RG9J-TMHE 
(listing respective cumulative GHG emissions of top 100 producers from 1988-
2015 as percentage of global GHG emissions); cf. Kysar, supra note 30, at 39 
(“[T]he climate change context poses distinct conceptual problems in terms of 
attribution, given the participation of so many actors in bringing about 
emissions. . ..”). 
218. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545 (quoting Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, 
Heimann & Bernstein, 69 P.3d 965, 969  (Cal. 2003)). See also Eric Biber, Law in 
the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 42–43 (2017) (explaining that proximate 
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short of proximate causation “where there is an independent 
intervening act that is not reasonably foreseeable” or the 
defendant’s conduct is so remote that “it would be considered 
unjust to hold him or her legally responsible.”219 Here, the fossil 
fuel company defendants are likely to argue that the ultimate 
consumers of fossil fuels are directly responsible for GHG 
emissions and should be considered an intervening cause.220 
Similar contentions were rejected in the lead paint litigation, 
however, and could be rejected here as well.221 Consumers’ burning 
of fossil fuels was intended by the defendants, and the resulting 
GHG emissions were completely foreseeable. This stands in 
contrast to the public nuisance litigation brought against gun 
manufacturers, where the criminal use of handguns qualified as 
an intervening cause largely because it was not intended by the 
manufacturers.222 
3. Public Right 
The somewhat indeterminate concept of public right is also 
likely to be litigated. In Conagra, the court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that no public right was at stake because interior 
residential lead paint “causes only private harms in private 
residences.”223 The court articulated a “‘public right’ to housing 
that does not poison children” and found even private residential 
housing to be “an essential community resource[,]” “like water, 
electricity, natural gas, and sewer services.”224 This interpretation 
of public right is broader than common law understandings of the 
concept, which focused on the use of public places or the activities 
 
cause reflects considerations such as whether a defendant’s actions are important 
enough to warrant litigation, whether the impacts of an action are too complicated 
to sort out, and whether recognition of extended chains of liability might paralyze 
potential actors). 
219. 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW TORTS § 1335 (11th ed. 
2017). 
220. Cf. Biber, supra note 219, at 43 (noting potential argument that “climate 
change is ultimately the product of emissions from the activities of billions of 
people over decades and even centuries.”). 
221. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545–46. 
222. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 822 (noting that injury from handguns 
results from a third-party’s criminal use of handguns rather than from proper use 
of the product).  
223. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552. 
224. Id.  
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of an entire community.225 It is also broader than the view 
expressed in a comment to the Second Restatement of Torts: 
 Conduct does not become a public nuisance merely because it 
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large number 
of persons. There must be some interference with a public right. 
A public right is one common to all members of the general 
public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right 
that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or 
negligently injured.226 
In finding the presence of lead in private housing to infringe 
upon a public right, the Conagra court arguably glossed over the 
Restatement’s distinction between a violation of a public right and 
multiple violations of private rights. 
The public right element of public nuisance is nonetheless 
likely to be satisfied in the climate change litigation, whether 
under the Conagra approach or the narrower common law 
understanding. Public nuisance has long encompassed 
interference with public highways, navigable waterways, and 
clean air.227 Climate change interferes with the use and enjoyment 
of not only the waterways and the air, but also a host of public 
places, including sewer and stormwater infrastructure, port 
infrastructure, public roads, and public beaches.228 It is a classic 
“public bad” involving “undesirable effects that are nonexcludable 
and nonrivalrous.”229 
4. Tortious Conduct 
Historically, public nuisance has been understood as “a type of 
harm resulting from a defendant’s conduct,” as opposed to a type 
of tortious conduct.230 Nevertheless, courts sometimes require 
 
225. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 815. 
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g. 
227. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 815; Lin, supra note 139, at 980–81 
(discussing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907), a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision applying public nuisance law to air pollution).  
228. SF Am. Compl. supra note 4, at 53–57; Kysar, supra note 30, at 13 
(describing public nuisance “as the logical cause of action to pursue” in climate 
change litigation “since it imports a duty to avoid injurious conduct to rights that 
are held by the public in common”). 
229. Merrill, supra note 205, at 8. 
230. GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 155; see Merrill, supra note 205, at 16. 
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proof of some sort of tortious conduct. As the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts puts it: a defendant’s “interference with the public right 
[must be] intentional or . . . unintentional and otherwise 
actionable under the principles controlling liability for negligent or 
reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous activities.”231 
With respect to product manufacturers, the tortious conduct 
at issue in a public nuisance case is the promotion of a product 
“with knowledge of the hazard that such use would create.”232 
Actual knowledge is required and may be proven through 
circumstantial evidence as to what a defendant must have been 
aware of.233 The climate change public nuisance complaints allege 
that the defendants knew that fossil fuels were contributing to 
global warming and nonetheless sought to promote their use.234 
Specific allegations cite a 1968 report informing the defendants 
that carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels were “almost 
certain’ to produce ‘significant’ temperature increases,” as well as 
internal company documents from the 1980s warning of 
“catastrophic” climate effects.235 If proven, these allegations 
appear sufficient to demonstrate the required knowledge. 
To prove that a defendant’s interference with a public right is 
tortious, plaintiffs must  also establish unreasonableness—a 
requirement that weighs the gravity of the harm against the utility 
of the conduct.236 The factors that courts consider in assessing 
unreasonableness include: whether the conduct significantly 
interferes with public health or safety; “whether the conduct is 
proscribed by statute . . . or regulation;” and “whether the conduct 
is of a continuing nature or has . . . [a] long-lasting effect[.]”237 
Notably, the specific conduct that should be analyzed for 
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unreasonableness is defendants’ promotion of fossil fuels with 
knowledge of its hazards, not the useful product itself.238 The social 
utility of this specific conduct appears minuscule in comparison to 
the long-lasting and devastating harms of climate change. 
If courts reach the substantive merits of the climate change 
public nuisance claims, the fossil fuel defendants face risks of 
liability. Although the defendants will hotly contest issues of 
causation, public rights, and benefit-harm balancing, California 
public nuisance law appears sufficiently broad to encompass 
defendants’ conduct and resulting harms. 
F. Federal Public Nuisance 
The district court’s decision to keep the San Francisco Bay 
lawsuits in federal court rested on its determination that the 
plaintiffs’ claims “are necessarily governed by federal common 
law.”239 The court acknowledged that the Clean Air Act displaced 
federal common law claims against domestic emitters of GHGs, per 
AEP and Kivalina, but reasoned that the San Francisco Bay 
lawsuits were arguably distinguishable because they aimed at “an 
earlier moment in the train of industry”—the production and sale 
of fossil fuels.240 Nonetheless, in later dismissing the case, the 
court found this distinction legally irrelevant, stating “[i]f an oil 
producer cannot be sued under the federal common law for their 
own emissions, a fortiori they cannot be sued for someone else’s.”241 
The court also declined to recognize a federal public nuisance claim 
for non-U.S. emissions—which are outside the scope of the Clean 
Air Act—on the ground that their regulation is best left to the 
political branches of government.242 
Even if a court were to reach the substantive merits of a 
federal public nuisance claim, proof of public nuisance may be more 
difficult under federal law than under California law. A line of 
Supreme Court decisions recognizes states’ ability to bring federal 
public nuisance actions to abate air and water pollution produced 
 
238. Cf. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596. 
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by other states or out-of-state industries.243 These decisions have 
left the precise contours of federal public nuisance law relatively 
undefined, however, and courts have looked to state standards and 
the Second Restatement of Torts to fill in the details.244 Lower 
courts have generally adopted the Restatement definition of public 
nuisance as a substantial and unreasonable interference with a 
right common to the general public.245 While the Restatement does 
not explicitly condition liability on a defendant’s control of the 
instrumentality causing the nuisance, federal courts may well 
adopt the majority view among the states that such control is 
required.246 As discussed above, the defendants in the climate 
change cases will likely contend that control of the instrumentality 
rests in the hands of their customers rather than themselves.247 
Furthermore, in determining whether defendants’ conduct was 
unreasonable, federal courts may be inclined to balance the social 
utility of fossil fuel use against the harms of climate change—a 
balancing approach less favorable than one focused more narrowly 
on defendants’ promotion of fossil fuels with knowledge of its 
hazards.248 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Developing climate change policy through individual 
abatement actions is less than ideal. Tort law typically addresses 
harms to identifiable persons resulting from actions by identifiable 
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actors, rather than broader threats to society.249 In terms of 
legitimacy, policymaking ideally occurs through democratically 
accountable legislative processes and authorized agency 
rulemaking, not litigation.250 Furthermore, a coordinated federal 
policy can bring agency expertise and resources to bear on a 
complicated problem involving multiple actors and generate a 
more effective response.251 Yet, in the absence of adequate 
legislative and executive responses to climate change, the plaintiff 
municipalities face very real harms from climate change and 
significant costs in adapting to rising sea levels. Public nuisance 
actions offer a potentially viable mechanism for abating the 
ongoing threat and financing the adaptation necessitated by the 
defendants’ past and present conduct. 
Successful public nuisance actions against fossil fuel 
defendants could prompt federal legislation to address climate 
change. Public nuisance litigation against the tobacco industry led 
to a negotiated settlement that—had it been approved by 
Congress—would have largely resolved defendants’ liability in 
exchange for curbing tobacco advertising and recognizing FDA 
authority over tobacco products.252 Public nuisance litigation 
against the gun industry also led to congressional efforts—this 
time successful—that insulated the industry from liability.253 The 
outcomes of these previous efforts to apply public nuisance hint at 
the difficult road ahead for advocates of climate change action. 
Even if they achieve favorable judgments in their actions for 
abatement, a legislated solution to climate change is not 
guaranteed to follow. These advocates will need to convince courts, 
policymakers, and the general public that the fossil fuel defendants 
should be held responsible for contributing to climate change and 
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that legislated policy to address climate change is warranted.254 
Ultimately, legislated outcomes might range from the creation of 
an adaptation fund financed by fossil fuel companies in exchange 
for protection from tort liability, or imposition of a carbon tax 
whose proceeds could be redistributed to local governments and 
individual citizens, to—at the other extreme—preemption of state 
tort litigation.255 
There are also potential outcomes short of success on the 
merits and/or a legislative fix that could still advance the ball on 
climate change. These cases represent a new pressure point on the 
fossil fuel industry, and a new spotlight on that industry’s 
engagement with climate law and policy. They make the case that 
these companies are not passive players who merely responded to 
consumer demand for fossil fuels but are bad actors who have lied 
for years to generate ever larger profits at the expense of the local 
governments and individual citizens and residents who bear the 
costs of climate impacts. The drama of the courtroom setting could 
mobilize the public’s interest and give life to local activism on these 
issues. Moreover, the prospect of adverse judgments might nudge 
fossil fuel companies to accelerate their own transition away from 
past practices, towards new approaches to providing energy to 
consumers. 
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